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I. INTRODUCTION
Rapid advances in radio technologies are simultaneously affording better
means of mitigating harmful interference while creating new demands on
spectral resources. An important component of this transformation is the
proliferation of unlicensed spectrum devices which previously were a relatively sleepy area of communications. These devices are generally permitted under Part 15 of the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC" or
"Commission") rules to emit radio frequency ("RF") energy, and require
no specific authorization, such as registration or grant of a license, for their
use.' As unlicensed device use has gathered momentum, it has put spectrum access in the hands of many. Despite the good that may come of open
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Counsel for Business and Economics, Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis,
Federal Communications Commission. The analyses and conclusions are those of the author
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' 47 C.F.R. § 15.1 (2005). While no specific user or site license is required, the unlicensed wireless devices are constrained by interference parameters and must be preapproved for use and sale through an authorization procedure under the auspices of the
FCC. The authorization process ensures that devices will not be available to the public
unless they comply with the FCC's rules, a measure intended to mitigate sources of harmful
interference to protected, authorized devices. See §§ 2.90, 15.101 (a). Unlicensed uses, however, do not receive protection from harmful interference. § 15.17.
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spectrum access, an unintended consequence of the ubiquity of unlicensed
devices may be to infringe upon the superior rights of incumbent spectrum
users. The growing demand for unlicensed spectrum access therefore fuels
a debate between licensed and unlicensed spectrum uses.2
The debate prompts a rethinking of current spectrum policy to ensure
that the potential of these new technologies is not stifled. In this arena,
unlicensed devices and licensed spectrum present diverging paradigms for
the assignment of spectrum.3 Much of the current policy debate is shaped
around the proper definition of spectrum rights-that is, a "property rights"
approach 4 versus a "commons approach" 5 to spectrum management.6 Socalled unlicensed spectrum use' is both an important driver and potential
beneficiary of these policy changes.
In modernizing spectrum policy, the FCC, which is responsible for overseeing the national airwaves in the public interest,8 faces the difficult task
2

The FCC has continued to allocate more spectrum for unlicensed use (e.g., at 3 GHz

and at 70/80/90 GHz), while licensed users below 3 GHz continue to demand more spectrum for high value use such as mobile telephony and data services. See generally In re
Additional Spectrum for Unlicensed Devices Below 900 MHz and in the 3 GHz Band,
Notice of Inquiry, 17 F.C.C.R. 25,632 (Dec. 20, 2002).
3 See Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, The Age of Personal
Communications: "Power to the People," Address Before the National Press Club (Jan. 14,
2004), in 12 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 139, 144 (2004) (recognizing the benefits of both
licensed and unlicensed spectrum).
4 See Dale B. Thompson, Of Rainbows and Rivers: Lessons for Telecommunications
Spectrum Policyfrom Transitionsin PropertyRights and Commons in Water Law, 54 BUFF.
L. REv. 157, 163-64 (2006) ("Under a property rights approach, property is held by a limited set of individuals, and an essential component of the property right is the right to exclude others from the use of that property.").
5 See id. at 163 ("Under a commons approach, property is held by the public and all
have the right to utilize that property.").
6
See, e.g., Eli Noam, Spectrum Auctions: Yesterday's Heresy, Today's Orthodoxy,
Tomorrow's Anachronism. Taking the Next Step to Open Spectrum Access, 41 J.L. & ECON.
765, 784-85 (1998); Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16
HAv. J.L. & TECH 25, 63 (2002). But cf, R.H. Coase, Comment on Thomas W. Hazlett;
Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did the FCC License Auction
Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 577 (1998). For a proposed synthesis, see Eli Noam, The
Fourth
Way
for
Spectrum,
FT.cOM,
Mar.
13,
2003,
http://search.ft.com/searchArticle?queryText=noam&y=O&javascriptEnabled=true&id=030
313008781&x=0 [hereinafter Fourth Way for Spectrum]; see also, Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless Communication, 82 TEx. L. REv. 863,
867-77 (2004).
7 See infra Part III.B.
8 See 47 U.S.C. § 303(y) (2000) ("[T]he Commission from time to time, as public
convenience, interest, or necessity requires, shall.., allocate electromagnetic spectrum...
[if] such an allocation would be in the public interest .. "). The FCC administers spectrum
allocated for use by non-federal government entities. The National Telecommunications
and Information Administration ("NTIA") is responsible for administering the spectrum
allocated for use by the Federal Government. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 305(a). The FCC and
the NTIA have exercised joint jurisdiction over the radio frequency spectrum since the
1940s under a Memorandum of Understanding, FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, MEMORANDUM
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of integrating rules implementing both the property and commons approaches, as opposed to opting for one regime over the other. In an effort
to modernize spectrum policy through an analysis of possible approaches,
the FCC established the Spectrum Policy Task Force ("Task Force"),9 a
group composed of senior staff members from several Bureaus and Offices. The Task Force's November 2002 report'0 noted that legacy regulation functioned to limit access to available spectrum and that such limitations are a more significant problem than the physical scarcity of spectrum
itself." The report further identified three distinct approaches to spectrum
policy: an exclusive use, or property, approach; a commons approach; and
a command-and-control approach. 12 Acknowledging that the commandand-control model dominated current policy, the Task Force nevertheless
recommended altering the balance to provide greater use of the exclusive
and commons models throughout the radio spectrum. 3 Implementation of
this recommendation will require increased regulatory flexibility and complexity."
The historic command-and-control approach focuses on "transmitter operation,"1 5 affording a limited number of persons (both natural and juridic)

OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND THE
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (2003), available at

http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-230835A2.pdf.
Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Chairman Michael Powell Announces
Formation of Spectrum Policy Task Force (June 6, 2002), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-223142AI.pdf.
10 FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT (2002), available
at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-228542A 1.pdf [hereinafter
SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT].

Id. at3.
Id. at 35. The Task Force report defined these three legal rights approaches as:
"Command-and-control" model. The traditional process of spectrum management in the
United States, currently used for most spectrum within the Commission's jurisdiction, allocates and assigns frequencies to limited categories of spectrum users for specific government-defined uses. Service rules for the band specify eligibility and service restrictions,
power limits, build-out requirements, and other rules.
"Exclusive use" model. A licensing model in which a licensee has exclusive and transferable flexible rights to the use of specified spectrum within a defined geographic area, with
flexible use rights that are governed primarily by technical rules to protect spectrum users
against interference.
"Commons" or "open access" model. Allows unlimited numbers of unlicensed users to
share frequencies, with usage rights that are governed by technical standards or etiquettes
but with no right to protection from interference. Id.
"3 Id. at 12.
14 Id. at 16.
15 See In re Interference Immunity Performance Specifications for Radio Receivers;
Review of the Commission's Rules and Policies Affecting the Conversion to Digital Television, Notice of Inquiry, 18 F.C.C.R. 6039, 9 (Mar. 13, 2003) ("[W]e believe it will be
necessary to shift our current paradigm for assessing interference from approaches based
primarily on transmitter operations towards new approaches that focus on the actual RF
"

12
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the ability to use the spectrum, defined along dimensions of frequency,
location and time. The recommended new approach will require a transformation from the current band-specific, rules-based methodology. The
proposed regime is based on the rights and obligations of individual parties, thus it demands a detailed understanding of the legal relations among
spectrum users. Despite the increased complexity arising out of this proposed approach, it has a distinct social benefit over the command-andcontrol model: it will enable a greater number of spectrum users to operate
with greater flexibility.16
Proponents on each side of the property rights vs. commons debate claim
that their preferred regime will promote efficiency, flexibility, and social
welfare. 7 The literature is replete with economic models, political appeals,
and references to real estate.' 8 Those who argue for the success of the licensed, command-and-control regime point to the widespread use and success of cellular phones. Those who push for a commons approach contend
that unlicensed devices also have been very successful, highlighting the
sales of cordless phones, baby monitors, and Wi-Fi devices. In many ways,
they both are correct.
Casting the debate as one in which only one regime is efficient and
should therefore prevail over the other constrains the dialogue and fails to
acknowledge that each approach offers advantages and disadvantages.
Regulators attempting to modernize spectrum policy must apply an integrated approach while minimizing the negative impacts of each regime.
There is precious little material offering a direct comparison demonstrating
the advantages and disadvantages of the licensed and unlicensed regimes.
This may be because the devices and services within both classifications
environment and interaction between transmitters and receivers, such as the interference
ternperature metric.").
ip

SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 15-16.
17 Compare Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth,

the Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's "Big Joke": An
Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335, 405 (2001) ("[A licensed
property rights approach] would allow for the efficient definition of rights, adjudication of
disputes (including interference) and easy entry into unoccupied property.") and Pablo T.
Spiller & Carlo Cardilli, Towards a Property Rights Approach to Communications Spectrum, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 53 (1999) (arguing that allocating the spectrum is best suited to a
licensing property rights approach) with Benkler, supra note 6, at 32-35 ("[The present
state of our technological knowledge, and the relevant empirical evidence we have with the
precursors of open wireless networks and with pricing in wired networks, lean toward a
prediction that open wireless networks will be more efficient in the foreseeable future.").
18 See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 6, at 49-67 (applying economic formulas to
determine
the social costs of wireless communication); James B. Speta, Making Spectrum Reform
"Thinkable", 4 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L., 183, 185-86 (2005-2006) (focusing on the
politics behind spectrum reform in communications legislation); Lawrence J. White, Propertyzing the ElectromagneticSpectrum: Why It's Important, and How to Begin, 4 N.Y.U.
MEDIA L. & POL'Y 19, 21 (2000) (analogizing real estate and the resultant property rights
that attach to spectrum).
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are so diverse as to frustrate a direct comparison. The uses and applications
of unlicensed devices run the gamut, ranging from remote control toys and
cordless telephones, to wireless computer networks and inventory control
systems.' 9 Moreover, the communications services that unlicensed devices
can offer and those services that commercial licensed providers can offer
are beginning to meld.2"
Fortunately for this analysis, in 1993 the FCC allocated two GHz of
spectrum to a new service it called Personal Communications Services
("U-PCS" or "unlicensed PCS"). 21 In an unusual tactic, the FCC assigned
PCS spectrum both by licenses awarded in competitive bidding auctions
and through an unlicensed model.2 Some may argue that a comparison
between licensed PCS with unlicensed PCS is not exactly a fair one. Given
the ubiquity of mobile phones, it is hard to argue that licensed PCS has not
been a huge success at lowering prices and spurring competition with cellular service. Conversely, unlicensed PCS has at best been a very late
bloomer, and at worst, dead.24 Nonetheless, the comparison still holds
value and the classifications still provide lessons, even though the unlicensed side has yet to live up to its full potential. This article does not intend to offer ideas as to how to put this spectrum to higher and better uses.
Nor does it attempt to diagnose the reasons why unlicensed PCS has thus

19 Kenneth R. Carter et al., Unlicensed and Unshackled: A Joint OSP-OET White Paper
on Unlicensed Devices and Their Regulatory Issues (FCC, Office of Strategic Plan. & Polat
available
2003),
13-21,
39,
No.
Paper
Working
icy,
http://hraunfass.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-234741AI.pdf. The technologies
are versatile enough to be used in devices ranging from life improving medical equipment
to cordless steak thermometers for a barbeque. Id. at 21.
20 This is because the same technologies, Wi-Fi, for example, are used in private homes
and are offered as a commercial service in places such as hotels and restaurants. The technology called "Wi-Fi" has become synonymous with cheap, ubiquitous broadband access as
well as the promise of unlicensed spectrum devices. Wi-Fi refers to the suite of Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers ("IEEE") wireless computer networking protocols that
includes the protocols 802.1 lb and 802.1 lg in the 2.4 GHz band, and IEEE 802.1 la in the
5.7 GHz band (among others). See In re Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced
Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and
Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Notice of Inquiry, 19 F.C.C.R. 5136, 25 n.30 Mar. 11, 2004. This
article limits its remarks to a comparison of unlicensed PCS services (not Wi-Fi) and commercial licensed services because the contrast is most striking and comparisons most valid.
21 In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal Communications Services, Second Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 7700, 1 30 (Oct. 22, 1993) [hereinafter Second Report and Order].
22 Id. at 11.
23 See infra Part III.A.2.
24 In fact, 10 MHz of spectrum available to unlicensed PCS laid fallow as there were no
authorized devices for operation in half the band. The Commission accordingly reallocated
the band to optimize its use. See infra Part III.B.2.
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far failed to live up to expectations.25 Rather, this article examines unlicensed Personal Communications Service in comparison to its sibling service, licensed PCS, seeking lessons for when to apply a licensed regime or
an unlicensed one.
This article focuses its analysis on the legal relationships created by different licensing regimes, shifting the focus from the "ether" or the "spectrum" to remedying externalities: the legal recourses available when one
person's use of a radio device degrades the performance of another's.
Awareness of such recourses gives spectrum users greater certainty and
more flexibility than under a command-and-control model. The ability to
interpret how each party affects another provides a means for mitigating
unintended consequences, and, hopefully, a better understanding of how
spectrum users might relate to one another in a diminished command-andcontrol world.
II. WHY A LICENSE?
When the FCC grants permission to operate equipment utilizing radio
frequencies, as required by the Communications Act or by FCC rules, it
does so by granting a license.26 Historically, rights granted by licenses assured that the number of users responsible for access to the spectrum was a
finite, manageable number. These users were sophisticated and easily definable, with strong incentives to adhere to the rules governing their spectrum use.27 In exchange for that use, licensees were afforded a bundle of
The expectations for unlicensed devices, however, are addressed in the article's
analysis. This article does not suggest that unlicensed PCS has been a failure. While some
might suggest that the unused U-PCS frequencies are wasting extremely valuable spectrum
below 1 GHz, the fact remains that it represents 0.0003% of spectrum from 9 kHz to 300
GHz under the FCC's jurisdiction. See 47 C.F.R § 2.106 (2005). Moreover, the FCC has
undertaken several proceedings to revitalize the unlicensed PCS bands. See infra Part
III.B.2. Since these are open proceedings, this article makes no comments on how the FCC
might improve these rules other than to summarize the proceeding as background. Rather,
comments in this article are limited to broad lessons drawn from the experience with the
state of the rules.
26 The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, defines "license" as the
"instrument
of authorization required ... for the use or operation of apparatus for transmission of energy, or communications, or signals by radio, by whatever name the instrument may be
designated by the Commission." 47 U.S.C. § 153(42) (2000). The statute further prohibits
the use of any apparatus which emits radio energy within or from any subdivision of the
United States except in accordance with the Act and under a license granted under the Act.
47 U.S.C. § 301. The major exceptions to the licensing requirement are those devices which
operate under Part 15 of the FCC's Rules. 47 C.F.R. § 15.1 (2005). Another notable exception to the licensing requirements, which is not the subject of this article, are Industrial,
Scientific, and Medical Equipment (ISM), enabled by Part 18 of the FCC's Rules. 47 C.F.R.
pt. 18.
27 See Ellen Goodman, Spectrum Rights in the Telecosm to Come, 41 SAN DtEGo L.REv.
269, 280-82 (2004).
25
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legal rights, as defined by the license, to protect their services from harmful interference which might be caused by other users.28
Radio frequency spectrum can be shared by various services but, unlike
many other natural resources, it can be repeatedly reused, albeit not in the
same place or at the same moment in time. Competing uses of radio
waves at the same point in time and space have a deleterious impact on
other radio devices, inhibiting the ability of radio waves to be used as
communications carriers. This effect is known as interference. 30 The probis frelem of competing uses, inaccurately referred to as "scarcity,'
quently referenced in legislation and court decisions as the justification for
regulation of the airwaves.32
Licensing is one form of intervention, as are technology, 33 pricing systems, and social norms,34 for coordinating competing uses of the radio
equipment. A system of licensing is, in essence, a capacity planning solution to the highly complex problem of allocating rival end user demand.
See 47 U.S.C. §§ 302(a-b), 303(f), 303(m)(1)(E) (2000) (establishing the Commission's rights to protect licensed users from interference).
29 See Goodman, supra note 27, at 285 ("Spectrum is simultaneously finite and renew28

able, everlasting and degradable.").
30 The FCC's rules currently define interference as "[t]he effect of unwanted energy due
to one or a combination of emissions, radiations, or inductions upon reception in a radiocommunications system, manifested by any performance degradation, misinterpretation, or
loss of information which could be extracted in the absence of such unwanted energy." 47
C.F.R. § 2.1 (2005). Before the level of use rises to a level such that the spectrum can be
used by no one, users may first experience a level of interference that creates congestion in
terms of lost signals and reduced capacity of the communications channel. This scarcity of
spectrum may naturally ration the resource if users are able to queue usage, repeat signals,
or if some users, who becoming frustrated with delays and congestion, opt to forgo their
spectrum use entirely. An example, invoking the often used roadway metaphor, might be
the person who decides to commute to work using public transportation after becoming
frustrated sitting in rush hour traffic jams. In this case, the individual who takes the subway
has stopped consuming the public good, e.g., the roadway. Even if he takes the bus, the
absence of his individual automobile reduces the aggregate demand on the public good. For
another analogy between infrastructure, such as roadways and telephones, to spectrum, see
generally Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructureand Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REv. 917 (2005).
3M See Benkler, supra note 6, at 27 (describing the historical agreement that spectrum
was scarce and thus necessitate expert regulation).
32 See e.g., Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 211 (1943); Red Lion
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-76 (1969). See also ERIK BARNOUW, A TOWER IN
BABEL: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES 30-32 (Oxford University
Press 1966); R. H. Coase, The Federal Communication Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 25
(1959); Arthur S. DeVany, et al., A Property System Approach to the Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-EngineeringStudy, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1499, 1504, 1548 (1968-69).
33 See Fourth Way for Spectrum, supra note 5 (proposing a system of spectrum allocation where holders use technology to lease spectrum to others).
34 Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662 (1998)
(introducing "The New Chicago School" approach to regulation, aiming to synthesize economic and norm accounts of the regulation of behavior).
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Future demand for the spectrum is completely random, making it unknowable ex ante.
To shortcut the demand allocation problem, licenses assign the right to
use the spectrum to a limited number of users. These users serve as financial or risk intermediaries. In financial terms, licensees are specialists who
take a position and attempt to resell it. Although there may be certain acceptable levels of contention between users for the public good, if left unchecked, total use may rise until the contention is so great that the resource
is unusable.35 In other capacity situations, over-demand may cause delay
for other users, but does not preclude all use. In addition, in many other
capacity planning problems, the system can afford the ability to queue rival
uses, rationing capacity over time. In this circumstance, the so-called
"tragedy of the commons" 36 may occur because, where there are no limits
on any one individual's use of the common resource, each person uses the
common resource without regard to rival users such that the resource eventually may be depleted. The difference between the licensing solution to
capacity planning and those solutions implemented in other capacityplanning problems is that in a licensing solution the benefits of spectrum
use accrue to a single user directly, while the costs are borne by all persons
in an unlicensed arena.
Most spectrum licenses are known as "radio station authorizations,"
whereby the FCC assigns bands of adjacent frequencies to particular applications, then allocates the right to those frequencies to minimize the problem of interference.37 This type of license permits operators to emit RF
energy at a particular power level, within a designated location for a specified period of time, within an assigned frequency band. 38 The Communications Act of 1934, as amended ("Communications Act"), provides for the
use of those bands but expressly precludes private ownership.3 9 The licenses are "exclusive" only in the sense that the FCC will not grant a license to a second party with the rights to the same frequency and geographic area. The licensee is therefore assured of protection from harmful
interference that could disrupt the normal operation in the licensed service
area within the assigned frequency band. 40

35 See Carter, supra note 19, at 13-21 (providing examples of the myriad uses and applications of unlicensed wireless devices).
36 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243, 1244 (1968).

3 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2000).

38 47 C.F.R. § 2.1(c) (2005).
39 47 U.S.C. § 301. But see Goodman, supra note 27, at 320-21 ("[C]ourts have still

recognized in FCC licenses some of the attributes of private property.").
40 See In re Amendment of Part 90 of the Commission's Rules to Facilitate Future Development of SMR Systems in the 800 MHz Frequency Band and implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act - Competitive Bidding 800 MHz SMR, Further
Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 10 F.C.C.R. 7970, U 42-43 (Nov. 4, 1994).
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By contrast, unlicensed, or "Part 15," devices, are granted some RF
emissions rights despite operating without first obtaining a station or user
authorization."' Unlicensed devices are permitted to operate on a sufferance basis,4" subject to five cardinal rules. Part 15 device users: (1) have no
vested right to continue using any frequency; 43 (2) must accept any interference generated by all other users, including other unlicensed uses;' (3)
may not cause harmful interference; 45 (4) must cease use if notified by
FCC that the device is causing harmful interference; 46 and (5) must have
equipment authorized (certificated) to show compliance with FCC standards before the device is marketed or imported. 7 Moreover, unlicensed
devices are permitted to employ only very low energy compared with the
vast majority of licensed devices.4 8 As such, the likelihood of harmful interference to other radio operators is acceptably small, and therefore unlicensed devices remain free from the restrictions of a licensing process.
III. PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS
In late 1993, the FCC amended its rules to allocate 160 MHZ in two GHz
of spectrum to PCS .49 While it declined to adopt a precise definition of the
services to be offered to consumers, the FCC "expected [PCS] to include
advanced forms of cellular telephone service, advanced digital cordless
phone service, portable facsimile services, wireless [private branch exchange] services, and wireless local area network [("W-LAN")] services,
among others."5 The Commission allowed PCS providers to employ a mix
of fixed and mobile services without technical specification-the first time
it had implemented such flexibility for licensees.5 ' Assignment of PCS
spectrum was made by licenses awarded in competitive bidding auctions,
and by an unlicensed approach. Broadband PCS licenses were auctioned
41

47 C.F.R. § 15.1 (2005).

42

In addition to limiting the technical constraints, one of the primary operating condi-

tions under Part 15 is that the operator must accept whatever interference is received and
must correct whatever interference is caused. Should harmful interference occur, the operator is required to immediately correct the interference problem, even if correction of the
problem requires ceasing operation of the Part 15 system causing the interference. See 47
C.F.R. § 15.5.
41

§ 15.5(a).

44

§ 15.5(b).

41

46
41

48

§ 15.5(b).
§ 15.5(c).

§ 15.37(a).
§ 15.319.

See Second Report and Order, supra note 2 1.
Id. 122.
"' Id. 135-38. While PCS is intended to be used for mobile communications, licensees can offer fixed services on an ancillary basis to their mobile operations. 47 C.F.R. §
99.3 (1994).
49
50
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beginning in 1995,52 and continued with the re-auction of NextWave C and
4
F block licenses in 200013 and the auction of some thirty MHz in 2005.1
As part of the creation of PCS, the band was reorganized.5 5 Prior to the
creation of PCS in the mid-1990s, Fixed Microwave Service, a nonauctioned, point-to-point, licensed service,56 was the primary user in the
band. The Commission created transition rules necessary to relocate Fixed
Microwave Service from the band, and, if not relocated, to eventually reduce it to secondary user status such that it would not cause harmful interference to PCS users. The vast majority of relocation of Fixed Microwave
users has been accomplished for both Broadband and unlicensed PCS.
A. Licensed PCS
1. Background
PCS licenses are used to provide spectrum for many of the more than
219 million mobile phones Americans use every day. 5' The FCC allocated
a total of 120 MHz for PCS 58 with the intention that it would compete with
pre-existing cellular service by offering mobile access to the public
switched telephone network, and by providing data communications as a
commercial service to the public on a retail basis. 59 In a subsequent order,
the FCC assigned these licenses through competitive bidding, also known

See In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect
to Commercial Mobile Services, Tenth Report, 20 F.C.C.R. 15908, 71, n.147 (Sept. 26,
2005).
53 See Auction of C and F Block Broadband PCS Licenses, Notice of Auction
Scheduled for July 26, 2000, Public Notice, 15 F.C.C.R. 693 (Jan. 12, 2000).
54 See Broadband PCS Spectrum Auction Scheduled for January 12, 2005, Notice
and
Filing Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments and Other Procedures for
Auction No. 58, Public Notice, 19 F.C.C.R. 18,190 (Sept. 16, 2004).
55 Second Report and Order,supra note 21,
141-42.
56 See47 C.F.R. § 101.1 (2005).
52

57

CELLULAR TELECOMMS.

&

INTERNET Ass'N, SEMI-ANNUAL

WIRELESS INDUSTRY

(2006) [hereinafter CTIA SEMI-ANNUAL WIRELESS INDUSTRY SURVEY], available
at http://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIAMidYear2006Survey.pdf.
58 The FCC created two classes of Licensed PCS: Narrow Band PCS and Broadband
PCS. Narrowband PCS was authorized in the 901-902, 930-931, and 940-941 MHz bands
(900 MHz band). 47 C.F.R. § 99.100 (1994). Broadband personal communications services
was authorized in the 1850-1890, 1930-1970, 2130-2150, and 2180-2200 MHz bands
(Blocks A through G). 47 C.F.R. § 99.200 (1994). These bands were channeled into two 30
MHz frequency blocks, one 20 MHz frequency block, and four 10 MHz frequency blocks.
59 Second Report and Order, supra note 21,
14. Cellular and PCS are now such close
substitutes and offered on a competitive basis that the average mobile phone user makes no
differentiation between the two classes of radio service.
SURVEY
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as an auction process. 6 The licenses were granted for a term of ten years
with an express expectancy of license renewal similar to those expectations
for cellular service licensees. 6' To protect incumbent Fixed Microwave
Service operations from interference, the FCC required PCS coordination
distances from 62 to 195 miles.62 However, it allowed PCS to operate at
power levels up to 100 watts for base stations and up to 2 watts for mobile
devices.63
The transition plan established three periods for the relocation of Fixed
Microwave Services in favor of Broadband PCS. 6 In the initial period, an
incumbent Fixed Microwave operator could voluntarily negotiate with
Broadband PCS licensees for relocation costs. 65 This period was followed
by a period of mandatory good faith negotiations. 66 At the end of the mandatory negotiation period, the Broadband PCS licensee could seek involuntary relocation of the Fixed Microwave licensee by providing the incumbent with comparable facilities.67 Broadband PCS licensees could make use
ITA 69 to remove common microwave
of the trade associations PCIA68 and
70
costs.
links and relocation process
60 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312,
directs the Commission to employ competitive bidding procedures by March 8, 1994, to
select among mutually exclusive applications for licenses to use the electromagnetic spectrum, provided that the service is one in which the licensee receives compensation from
subscribers for the use of those frequencies. See In re Implementation of Section 3090) of
the Communications Act Competitive Bidding, Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 8 F.C.C.R.
7635, 1[1-2 (Oct. 12, 1993).
61 Second Report and Order, supra note 21,
131. Licensees must serve with a signal
level sufficient to provide adequate service to at least one-third of the population in their
licensed area within five years of being licensed, two-thirds of the population in their licensed area within seven years of being licensed, and ninety percent of the population in
their licensed area within ten years of being licensed. Population is defined as the 1990
census population. Failure by any licensee to meet these requirements will result in forfeiture of the license and the licensee will be ineligible to regain it. Id. at 134.
62 Id. at tbl. 3.
63 Id. at$ 156.
64 In re Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage Innovation in the Use of New Telecommunications Technologies, Third Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 6589, 15 (July 15, 1993).
65

id.

66 Id.
67 Id. 16. "Comparable facilities" is defined as being "equal to or superior to existing
facilities." Id. at 36. Factors in determining comparable facilities include, but are not
limited to, "system reliability, capability, speed, bandwidth, throughput, overall efficiency,
bands authorized for such services, and interference protection." Id.
68 The Personal Communications Industry Association ("PCIA") works "to facilitat[e]
the emergence and growth of core wireless services." The PCIA Legacy: We Build Industries, http://www.pcia.comlabout_pcia/history.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2006).
69 The Enterprise Wireless Associates (formerly "ITA") "works to preserve spectrum
rights and access for enterprise wireless customers." Enterprise Wireless Alliance,
http://www.enterprisewireless.org/about/about.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2006).
70 See PCIA Microwave Clearinghouse, http://www.pcia.com/microwave/microhome.
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To spark the creation of a national market for PCS, the FCC granted licenses for service areas defined using Rand McNally's Major Trading Areas ("MTAs") and Basic Trading Areas ("BTAs"). 7' At the time of the
licensing, there were 49 MTA-based service areas and 487 BTA-based
services areas. 72 Licensees were permitted to aggregate service areas nationwide without restriction and, except for licensees with cellular interests, were allowed to aggregate up to forty MHz in any one service area.73
In order to service its customers, PCS licensees were required to build
networks of FCC-compliant radio towers.74 Nationwide licensees were
required to construct a minimum of 250 base stations within five years of
being licensed, and at least 500 base stations within ten years.75 In MTAs,
licensees were required to construct base stations to provide coverage to
approximately twenty-five percent of the geographic area of their licensed
service area within five years of being licensed, and fifty percent of the
geographic area of their licensed service area within ten years of being
licensed.76 Licensees in BTAs had to construct at least one base station and
begin providing service in their licensed service area within one year.77 All
licensees were
required to notify the Commission when these benchmarks
78
were met.
2. Network Infrastructureand Business Models
PCS has been a huge boon for the American people. The U.S. wireless
market is highly contested, with four nationwide carriers 79 providing mobile voice and data services over cellular and broadband PCS systems.8 °

htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2006).
71 See 47 C.F.R. § 24.202 (2005) ("Broadband PCS service areas are Major Trading
Areas (MTAs) and Basic Trading Areas (BTAs) as defined in this section. MTAs and BTAs
are based on the Rand McNally 1992 Commercial Atlas & Marketing Guide, 123rd Edition,
at pages 38-39[, with some exceptions and additions.]").
72 Second Report and Order, supra note
21, 64.
"3 Id. 78, n.70.
74 Id. 134.
7' 47 C.F.R. § 99.103(a) (1994).
76 § 99.103(b).
17 § 99.103(c).
78

id.

"As of year-end 2005, there were four mobile telephone operators in the United
States that analysts typically describe as 'nationwide': Sprint Nextel Corp. ('Sprint
Nextel'), Verizon Wireless, LLC ('Verizon Wireless'), T-Mobile, and Cingular Wireless,
LLC ('Cingular Wireless' or 'Cingular')." In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993; Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive
Market Conditions With Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, Eleventh Report, FCC06-142, 25 (Sept. 29, 2006) (internal citations omitted).
80 Id. T I 61-64. A third type of spectrum license, SMR, also provides mobile
service,
but it is distinct from cellular and PCS in that it does not connect to the public switched
79
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The benefit of this competition has been lower prices 81 and a growing diversity of service offerings. As a result, the ranks of wireless subscribers
swelled from 16 million in December 1993 to 219 million in June 2006.82
In addition to their growing numbers, the services available for purchase
by these subscribers also burgeoned.83 Competition to offer a variety of
services forced wireless carriers on a spending spree; carriers have cumulatively spent more than $199 billion to upgrade their networks in recent
years.84 Today, companies are investing heavily in third-generation, or
"3G," networks85 capable of providing high-speed data connectivity comparable to current fixed-line communications.8 6
B. Unlicensed PCS
1. Background
Similar to licensed PCS, unlicensed PCS was created with the intention
to fill a wide range of new wireless uses for voice and data services.87
Originally, the FCC allocated forty MHz, at 1890-1930 MHz, for unlicensed PCS devices.8 8 U-PCS devices were permitted in the 1910-1930
MHz and 2390-2400 MHz bands.89 The FCC's rules governing U-PCS
devices are similar in most major respects to other Part 15 devices, including the low power restrictions, the requirement that the devices not cause
harmful interference, and that the users must accept all interference they
receive. The FCC imposed several additional service rules on U-PCS devices operating in the 1910-1930 band. Foremost are rules requiring that
the devices monitor the spectrum prior to transmission. 9° These rules were
implemented because the FCC believed that U-PCS systems could share

telephone network, permitting connectivity only between like devices within one network.
SMR has largely been used for dispatch services. Id. 64.
8" Id.
151 ("[Tlhere is ample evidence of a sharp decline in mobile telephone prices in
the period since the launch of PCS service. One analyst estimated that the average perminute cost of wireless calling plunged 72 percent in the past five years alone.") (citation
omitted).
82 CTIA SEMI-ANNUAL WIRELESS INDUSTRY SURVEY, supra note 57.
83 Cellular Telecomms.
& Internet Ass'n, Taxes, Fees, and Surcharges,
httg://www.ctia.org/industry-topics/topic.cfmITID/27/CTID/14 (last visited Nov. 1, 2006).
Id.
85 See, e.g., Sanford Nowlin, 3G: The Next Big Leap, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS,
Aug. 10, 2006, at 1E ("Sprint Nextel, Cingular Wireless and Verizon Wireless have spent
about $10 billion to launch next-generation networks in the United States.").
86 Id.
87 Second Report and Order, supra note 21, 1 1.
88 Id. T 3.
89 47 C.F.R § 15.307(a) (2005).
90 47 C.F.R. § 15.323(c).
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the band with Broadband PCS without causing harmful interference to
those systems.9
To further minimize the potential of U-PCS devices interfering with
other users of the 1910-1930 band, unlicensed operations are subdivided
into two classifications: isochronous (principally voice) operations in the
1920-1930 MHz portion, and asynchronous (principally data) operations
in the 1910-1920 MHz portion of the band.92 These classifications follow
different radio transmission requirements as demanded by the different
types of services. Data communications tend to require short, "bursty"
asynchronous transmissions. The FCC elected to optimize the 1910-1920
MHz band in order to facilitate spectrum sharing among asynchronous
devices.93 By contrast, voice communications tend to exhibit longer and
more predictable transmissions. Voice devices, such as a system of wireless handsets, can be synchronized. 94 Currently, the most widespread appli91 In re Amendment of Part 2 of the Commission's Rules to Allocate Spectrum Below 3
GHz for Mobile and Fixed Services to Support the Introduction of New Advanced Wireless
Services, including Third Generation Wireless Systems; The Establishment of Policies and
Service Rules for the Mobile-Satellite Service in the 2 GHz Band; Amendment of the U.S.
Table of Frequency Allocations to Designate the 2500-2520/2670-2690 MHz Frequency
Bands for the Mobile-Satellite Service; Petition for Rule Making of the Wireless Information Networks Forum Concerning the Unlicensed Personal Communications Service; Petition for Rule Making of UTStarcom, Inc., Concerning the Unlicensed Personal communications Service, Third Report and Order, Third Notice of ProposedRulemaking and Second
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 18 F.C.C.R. 2223, 9 39-40 (Feb. 10, 2003) [hereinafter
Third Notice of Proposed Rulemaking]. In the United States, the 1910-1930 MHz band is
allocated to the fixed and mobile services on a primary basis. See 47 C.F.R. § 2.106 (2005).
The 1910-1930 MHz band is part of bandwidth allocated internationally to the fixed and
mobile services on a primary basis and has been designated as a candidate band for administrations wishing to implement IMT-2000 services Id. at n.5.388. International footnote
5.388A states that the 1910-1930 MHz and other frequency bands may be used by high
altitude platform stations as base stations to provide IMT-2000 services. Id. at n.5.388A.
92 Asynchronous devices are defined as those "that transmit RF energy at irregular time
intervals, as typified by local area network data systems," and isochronous devices are
defined as those "that transmit at a regular interval, typified by time-division voice systems." 47 C.F.R. § 15.303(a)-(d) (2005). Specific requirements for the operation of asynchronous devices in the 1910-1920 MHz band are codified at 47 C.F.R. § 15.321 (2005)
and specific requirements for the operation of isochronous devices in the 1920-1930 MHz
band are codified at 47 C.F.R. § 15.323 (2005).
93 See In re Amendment of Part 2 of the Commission's Rules to Allocate Spectrum
Below 3 GHz for Mobile and Fixed Services to Support the Introduction of New Advanced
Wireless Services, including Third Generation Wireless Systems; Petition for Rule Making
of the Wireless Information Networks Forum Concerning the Unlicensed Personal Communications Service; Petition for Rule Making of UTStarcom, Inc., Concerning the Unlicensed
Personal Communications Service; Amendment of Section 2.106 of the Commission's
Rules to Allocate Spectrum at 2 GHz for use by the Mobile-Satellite Service, Sixth Report
and Order, Third Memorandum and Order, and Fifth Opinion and Order, 19 F.C.C.R.
20,720, 18 n.13 (Sept. 22, 2004).
94 The monitoring rules require asynchronous devices to monitor the spectrum before
use for at least 50 microseconds prior to initiating a transmission. See 47 C.F.R. § 15.321
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cation of the 1920-1930 MHz U-PCS band is for wireless private branch
exchanges ("PBX"). 95 Twenty-seven original U-PCS devices are currently
authorized to operate under Part 15(d) equipment authorizations; none are
authorized to operate in the 1910-1920 MHz band.96
Before the FCC permitted U-PCS, the 1910-1930 MHz band was allocated to Fixed Microwave Service for point-to-point links. 97 The 1993 Order establishing U-PCS created a not-for-profit organization, the Unlicensed PCS Ad Hoc Committee for 2 GHz Microwave Transition and
Management ("UTAM"), which was conditionally designated to manage
this relocation.9 8 The Commission subsequently established policies for the
relocation of incumbent microwave systems from this band and confirmed
its designation of UTAM to manage the transition.99 Under these policies,
all manufacturers of U-PCS equipment are required to participate in
UTAM' ° and are required to pay fees, initially set at twenty dollars per
handset deployed,'O° to offset UTAM's costs for relocating the microwave
systems.'0 2 The relocation requirements10 3 also restrict U-PCS devices in
their geographic operation in a way that other Part 15 devices are not. UPCS handset devices may only operate in locations approved by UTAM
for U-PCS. "o
(2005). Isochronous devices are limited to specific channels and must monitor for only 10
or 20 milliseconds, depending on the design of the system. § 15.323.
95 PBXs or "switches" are "computers that direct telephone calls and data transmissions
through a network of private extensions." Telecom Tech. Servs. v. Rolm Co., 388 F.3d 820,
823 (11 th Cir. 2004).
96 The FCC's Equipment Authorization System Generic Search database allows
searches of equipment authorizations in specific frequency ranges. See OET Generic Search
Report,
https://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/oet/cf/eas/reports/GenericSearch.cfm?calledFromFrame=N
(last visited Nov. 1, 2006).
9' See 47 C.F.R. § 101.69 (showing the transition of use for the 1850-1990 MHz band
from fixed microwave to use for PCS and emerging technologies).
98 Second Report and Order, supra note 21, 5/88; Amendment of the Commission's
Rules to Establish New Personal Communications Services, Fourth Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 7955, 1 (May 12, 1995) [hereinafter FourthMemorandum Opinion and Order].
99 See FourthMemorandum Opinionand Order,supra note 98, 1.
'00 47 C.F.R. § 15.307(a)-(c) (2005).
101 Fourth Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 98, 9. The fee schedule has
changed so that the cost per unit has been lowered substantially to $0.50 after a $50,000
one-time, upfront deposit by the manufacturer. See UTAM Home Page,
http://www.utam.org/ClearingFees.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2006) (noting that the fees
were changed to promote the use of devices such as cordless telephones, walkie-talkies and
monitors in the bandwidth).
102 UTAM has incurred more than $60 million in liabilities relocating the spectrum. See
In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal Communications
Devices, UTAM Report to the FCC,GEN Docket No. 90-314, at 9 (July 1, 2002).
103 The FCC rules concerning U-PCS relocation are codified at 47 C.F.R. §§ 101.69101.81 (2005).
'04 § 15.307(c)-(e).
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In order to keep U-PCS devices from operating in places where microwave users have not been relocated, the rules contemplate two classes of
U-PCS devices: "coordinatable" and "noncoordinatable." Coordinatable UPCS devices, like wireless PBXs, can be designed for operation only in
places that allow adequate coordination with incumbent fixed microwave
facilities.10 5 For FCC approval, these devices must have a mechanism that
will disable them when they are moved outside that area.'0 6 A noncoordinatable U-PCS device is not tied to a geographic area.'0 7 The FCC will not
approve the application for a device that UTAM deems noncoordinatable. 10 8 However, these provisions are designed to expire once the
Commission determines that there is no longer a need to coordinate with
fixed microwave users. °9
The relocation of incumbent microwave users has been quite successful.
In fact, UTAM reports that it has cleared the band of most microwave link
operators. UTAM's homepage notes that, as of 2005, "remaining microwave link[s] operating in this band, of which there are only a small handful, lost their primary status and UTAM no longer needed to be concerned
with any potential interference to these incumbents. As a result, many of
the controls put on by UTAM are no longer required."" 0 This success is
attributable to the considerable efforts and financial resources UTAM and
its industry members expended in clearing the U-PCS bands of incumbent
fixed microwave links."'
2. The UncertainFuture of Unlicensed PCS
Despite the success of UTAM in transitioning the band from microwave
link operators, the future of unlicensed PCS is uncertain at best. It is generally agreed that U-PCS developed rapidly despite numerous challenges and
difficulties, but its full potential remains untapped. 1 2 UTAM, along with
the Wireless Information Networks Forum ("WlINForum"), asserted that
delays in the widespread development of U-PCS were due to the relocation
'0'§ 15.307(d).
'0'§ 15.307(e).
107 § 15.303(e).
108 § 15.307(c).
'09§ 15.307(f).

"0 UTAM Homepage, http://www.utam.org/index.html (last visited Nov. 1,2006).
"' See, e.g., In re Amendment of Part 2 of the Commission's Rules to Allocate Spectrum Below 3 GHz for Mobile and Fixed Services, Comments of UTAM, Inc., FCC 03-16,
at 3 (Apr. 14, 2003) (accessible via FCC Electronic Filing System).
112 See Ellen Goodman et al., An Overview of Problems and Prospects in U.S. Spectrum
Management, 698 PLI/PAT 327, 356 (2002) ("While the Commission has noted that [UPCS] bands were underutilized, several UPCS operators/manufacturers have argued that
UPCS spectrum use is increasing rapidly, particularly as incumbent users of these bands are
being reallocated .... Utilization of the unlicensed bands is still at an early stage and is
likely to grow ...").
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of microwave incumbents from the U-PCS band and the strict Part 15D
spectrum etiquette required by the rules." 3 Development was initially also
slowed by spectrum users' preference for the technological flexibility,
wider bands," 4 and geographic freedom afforded by other kinds of Part 15
operation over U-PCS, coupled with the fact that there was no handset
fee." 5 As a result, the band of spectrum dedicated to asynchronous devices
lay fallow.
Given the early lackluster performance of the service, the Commission
initiated several proceedings seeking to allocate the band to higher value
uses. 1 16 Two of the bands have been realigned, with five MHz of spectrum
given to Nextel Communications and five MHz reassigned for Advanced
Wireless Service ("AWS")." 7 In August 2004, the Commission assigned
the 1910-1915 MHz band' 8 to Nextel for the provision of licensed fixed
and mobile service as part of the planned re-banding of the 800 MHz for
interference abatement among public safety systems." 9 This spectrum was
given in exchange for the spectrum properties Nextel relinquished in the
re-banding. To accomplish the exchange, the Commission adopted a
UTAM-sponsored reimbursement plan in which Nextel was required to
pay to UTAM a pro rata share of the band-clearing costs. 120 As such,
Nextel was required to pay twenty-five percent of the costs UTAM incurred to clear the U-PCS band as of the date Nextel began using the
band. 12' The following month, the Commission paired the block of specIn re Amendment of Part 2 of the Commission's Rules to Allocate Spectrum Below 3
GHz for Mobile and Fixed Services, Reply Comments of UTAM, Inc./WINForum, FCC 0316, at 5-6 (Nov. 8, 2001) [hereinafter Reply Comments of UTAM, Inc./WINForum].
114 The spectrum available for other types of Part 15 devices
can be as wide as 25 MHz,
but only 10 MHZ for either class of U-PCS.
115 See supra Part III.B.I.
116 Third Notice of ProposedRulemaking, supra note 91, at 12. See also In re Improving
Public Safety Communications in the 800 MHz Band, Report and Order, Fifth Report and
Order, Fourth Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Order 19 F.C.C.R. 14969, IN 227-28
(Aug. 6, 2004) (noting that the public would be best served by reallocating the 1910-1915
band away from U-PCS) [hereinafter Improving Public Safety Communications].
117 See In re Amendment of Part 2 of the Commission's Rules to Allocate Spectrum
Below 3 GHz for Mobile and Fixed Services to Support the Introduction of New Advanced
Wireless Services, including Third Generation Wireless Systems, Sixth Report and Order,
Third Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19
F.C.C.R. 20,720, 20,722 at n.1 (Sept. 22, 2004) ("Advanced Wireless Services is the collective term we use for new and innovative fixed and mobile terrestrial wireless applications
using bandwidth that is sufficient for the provision of a variety of applications, including
those using voice and data (such as internet browsing, message services, and full-motion
video) content.").
118 This band is paired with the 5 MHz between 1990 and 1995
MHz. Improving Public
Safety Communications, supra note 116, at 217.
119 Id.
120 Id. 1223.
121 Id. 240.
113
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trum at 1915-1920 with 1995-2000 MHz, making it available for AWS.' 22
In order to compensate UTAM for expenses incurred in relocating incumbents from the 1915-1920 MHz band, the FCC required new AWS licensees to pay twenty-five23 percent of the total costs UTAM incurred, including future obligations.
In the same order, the FCC turned its attention to modifying its Unlicensed PCS rules for the 1920-1930 MHz band in order to provide additional flexibility. The FCC changed the channelization requirements, doubling the maximum channel band to 2.5 MHz. 124 Most notably, the FCC
did away with the "isochronous" designation in the specific operating re25
quirements and removed "listen before talk" rules (the "packing rule").1
Instead of imposing spectrum etiquette, the rules now only require that a
U-PSC device "must incorporate a mechanism for monitoring the time and
spectrum windows that its transmission is intended to occupy.' 26 This
increased flexibility will go a long way toward putting unlicensed PCS
devices on par with other unlicensed devices.
IV. SPECTRUM POLICY LESSONS FROM PCS
All spectrum policy creates legal rights; how and to whom those legal
rights are assigned is pivotal to shaping the way the market for the communications services offered develops. This is especially true given the
range of options of licensed and unlicensed approaches. Both Broadband
and unlicensed PCS were expected to provide a variety of similar mobile
communications services, albeit on different geographic scales. The difference in the two licensing regimes' geographic footprints causes two very
different market outcomes. This difference is increased by the legal
statuses that create a centralized market of service providers in the licensed
regime and a generally decentralized market of unlicensed equipment
manufacturers in the unlicensed regime. The fundamental policy question
is: what will be the beneficial effect of aggregating control over the spectrum resource?
The legal rights to use radio waves to carry and receive communications
signals clearly would be of only marginal value if granted to a limited
handful of entities for their own use. Thus, in the Broadband PCS world,
the spectrum necessarily becomes an input to a final service offered for
122

In re Amendment of Part 2 of the Commission's Rules to Allocate Spectrum Below 3

GHz for Mobile and Fixed Services to Support the Introduction of New Advanced Wireless
Services, including Third Generation Wireless Systems, Sixth Report and Order, Third
Memorandum Opinionand Order, and Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 F.C.C.R.
20,720, 41 (Sept. 22, 2004).
123 Id.153.
124

Id. 177.

125
126

Id. 181.
47 C.F.R. § 15.323(c) (2005).
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sale to the public. In addition to the protection from interference, the license also serves as a barrier to competitive entry by limiting the number
of firms which have access to the primary input.'2 7 Whether explicit or
implicit in the regulatory intent in granting the license, this barrier to entry
affords the licensee protection against expropriation of its network investment by competition that would decrease the profits from providing a wireless service. Thus, licensees are willing to spend lavishly for these legal
rights and on further
capital investments in fixed infrastructure to expand
28
their networks.
By contrast, unlicensed operation tends to collapse the value chain, reducing the importance of the wireless service provider and increasing the
importance of equipment manufacturers and retail suppliers. Unlicensed
PCS is an equipment market in which end users buy their own network
gear and connectivity, and provide service for their own communications
needs. In addition to sidestepping the normal delays associated with the
licensing process, the devices can enjoy spectrum which is not encumbered
by license fees.
Generally, unlicensed devices benefit from lower costs and more rapid
development cycles. Until recently, the scope of unlicensed devices was
limited, providing only short-range applications such as toys, gadgets, and
novelties, but unlicensed devices are becoming more pervasive. 129 Driven
by rapid advances in technology, entrepreneurship, and enabling government policies, unlicensed RF devices are increasingly able to offer applications in all areas of industry, government, and in private homes. 30 An unlicensed regime increases consumer investment in the network, providing an
incentive for greater creativity in evolving network applications. 31 Moreover, because the equipment retailer is not receiving reoccurring service
127

Noam, supra note 6. In this sense, the spectrum license functions in the same manner

as a traditional form of intellectual property right, such as a patent or copyright, which
affords a period of exclusivity from competition.
128 Some have argued that the payment of a license fee hampers the deployment of networks and increases the cost of service to the end user. See, e.g., id. But cf., Evan Kwerel,
Spectrum Auctions Do Not Raise the Price of Wireless Services: Theory and Evidence
(FCC, Office of Plan. & Policy, 2000), availableat http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/data/
papersAndStudies/SpectrumAuctionsDoNotRaisePrices.pdf (arguing that the cost of a wireless license is a sunk cost which does not affect the end user's price). Whether or not the
carrier treats the cost of the spectrum license as a sunk cost, the cost of the license and the
capital expenditures are, nonetheless, rival uses of the firm's cash.
129 See, e.g., In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal
Communications Devices, UTAM Report to the FCC, GEN Docket No. 90-314, at 4 (July 1,
2006) (accessible via FCC Electronic Filing System) (noting that since the microwave operations were relocated in 2005 there has been a spike in deployment of new nomadic devices).
130 Unlicensed devices now ranges from remote control toys, wireless computer networking systems, telephones and inventory control systems. See Carter, supra note 19.
131 See Werbach, supra note 6; Goodman, supra note 27, at 364-65.
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revenues, the retailer has an incentive to provide innovative product offerings to entice existing users to purchase upgraded equipment on a regular
basis.
When the services offered by wireless communications are not well defined or unknown at the time rules are drafted, an unlicensed regime offers
certain advantages for the development of the services, such as competition, product innovation, and user investment in wireless networks. Under
an unlicensed scenario, network operators can limit the risk of stranding
network equipment investments by passing the costs of the wireless
equipment on to the consumer. If the end user eventually does not demand
the wireless service, or can get a better deal from a competitor, the network
provider does not lose the investment in the unlicensed gear. By contrast,
granting licenses to a small, identifiable group of commercial service providers can help to promote the Commission's policy goals such as ubiquitous coverage, universal service, common carriage, or continuity of service. Given the success, however, of the FCC's equipment-authorization
approach in controlling interference caused by unlicensed operation, it is
very possible that such an approach could be used as a vehicle to achieve
other policy goals as well.
A. Distributing Use
Aggregation over control of the spectrum in the form of a license is one
means by which to distribute competing uses of the spectrum. Distributing
use, though problematic, is necessary due to the variable nature of demand
on the resource and the fact that increased use imposes an external cost on
all users. Without some form of legal rights (including sharing rules), there
is no means of determining use priority by which spectrum users can exclude others. To the extent technical measures can be used to tolerate competing uses, such prioritization is unnecessary.
The Broadband PCS licensee is afforded the privilege to use much higher
power RF, giving the licensee the ability to cover a large geographic area
with service. Within these service areas, the licensee's use is not subject to
the collective background emissions of unlicensed and errant users that
would degrade its communications channel. Free from the cost of other
uses, the licensee is able to coordinate the spectrum use within its band. It
typically does so by the spectrum-sharing technologies incorporated in its
network, such as Code Division Multiple Access ("CDMA") 132 or Time
Division Multiple Access ("TDMA") 1 33 Driven by competitive pressures
132

CDMA is "a digital, spread spectrum, packet based access technique generally used

in RF radio sytems." NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 210 (22nd ed. 2006).
133 TDMA is defined as "[olne of several technologies used to separate multiple conversation transmissions over a finite frequency allocation of through-the-air bandwidth." Id. at
892.
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from wireless service providers operating in other bands, the licensee
strives to maximize use within its band. 134 Such a spectrum licensee will
optimize its efficiency of use due in part to its technical advantages in coordination over unlicensed operation. 3 There is little incentive for such
licensees to take on the costs associated with deploying more sophisticated,
robust receivers to reduce unusable spectrum, which would enable other
users to share the band. 36 The licensee will set its level of spectral efficiency so as to maximize its profits. This set level does not directly equate
to the best possible level of use socially, and may in fact fall below that
amount.
License regimes with an imposed sharing technique are generally more
efficient than those in which competing uses are not coordinated. Total
social welfare, however, may be greater under the uncoordinated system if
the cost of mitigating interference is slight as compared to the efficiency
gain. The cost of interference, which may be intolerable to Broadband PCS
users, might be perfectly acceptable to an unlicensed user not paying recurring fees. 1 37 However, the fact that unlicensed devices are an increasingly
viable means of communication runs contrary to the conventional wisdom
that without the formal regulation and licensing of radio operations, interference inevitably will lead to the tragedy of the commons. As a technical
matter, because they receive no interference protection, unlicensed devices
have to be designed to be robust enough to tolerate a hostile environment,
if they are to work at all.'38 In general, this survivability approach is how
unlicensed devices deal with interference.
The rules governing U-PCS include additional limitations on the emission of RF energy, however, that change the regulatory analysis. The emission privilege is limited by a spectrum etiquette mandated for unlicensed

134 See In re Unlicensed and Unshackled: A Joint OSP-OET White Paper on Unlicensed
Devices and Their Regulatory Issues, Comments of AT&T Wireless Services, Inc., ET
Docket No. 03-126, at 5 (Aug. 21, 2003) (accessible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing
System).
135 See James B. Speta, A Vision of Internet Openness by Government Fiat,96 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1553, 1572 (2002) ("Where there is a single licensee either operating its own service
or acting as a bandwidth manager, that licensee can mandate the use of equipment or protocols that fully utilize the spectrum. But where each device controls itself, the best that can
be done is to use protocols that permit the spectrum to be used approximately sixty percent
of the time.").
136 This may be conceptually similar to the obligation for motorists to install mufflers
in
their cars. The muffler is a cost burden that the motorist might not normally undertake
unless he is particularly sensitive to noise. However, the resulting externality of no motorist
installing a muffler might be that the average highway would be unacceptably loud to those
using it and certainly to those living nearby.
137 Carter, supra note 19, at 13-21.
138 Id. Due to the comparatively hostile spectral environment, highly efficient technologies such as spread spectrum, UWB, and OFDM have been evolved and provide some relief
from the problem of interference. Id.
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PCS devices. The etiquette, in the form of a "listen-before-talk" rule, is a
spectrum-sharing technique that reduces the probability of conflicting signals by requiring the devices to monitor for other spectrum signals for a
fixed period of time before emitting their own.139 U-PCS devices must also
limit transmission for a fixed duration."4 Limitation on the privilege to
emit radio energy increases overall use efficiency by allowing one spectrum user to use the spectrum while other users are idle. ln' This is the only
instance of an etiquette mandated on spectrum devices in the Commission's rules.'42
U-PCS is the only spectrum use on which the FCC has imposed an etiquette requirement.' 43 The Commission considered a similar etiquette when
it created rules for unlicensed operation under another section of Part 15,
termed the Unlicensed National Information Infrastructure ("U-NIl").44 In
that proceeding, the FCC ultimately rejected mandatory spectrum etiquette
for U-NII devices. 145 The U-NIl order instead allowed for the market to
develop technique-specific designs for spectrum sharing.'" U-NII devices,
such as Wi-Fi, can provide the same functionality as U-PCS devices without having to obey the spectrum etiquette obligations. 47 Sales of these devices (employing fault-tolerant receivers and industry sharing standards)
have surged while U-PCS devices have not been so pervasive. U-PCS industry associations such as UTAM/WINForum contend that among the
reasons for the lack of widespread development of U-PCS is the strict Part
15 spectrum etiquette required by the rules. 48 When comparing between
139

This can be compared to a dinner conversation where speakers give deference to

other speakers for purposes of politeness and conversational efficiency. See Patrick S.
Ryan, Application of the Public-Trust Doctrine of NaturalResource Management to ElectromagneticSpectrum, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 285, 298 (2004).
140An upper limit on duration may increase spectral inefficiency if the limit is not chosen with regard to optimal performance. See Durga P. Satapathy & Jon M. Peha, Performance of Unlicensed Devices with a Spectrum Etiquette, 1 PROCEEDINGS OF IEEE GLOBECOM
414, 416 (Nov. 1997).
141
142
143

Id. at 414.
id.
This requirement is now all but moot. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying

text.
'A
145

See 47 C.F.R. §§15.401-15.407 (2005).
In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Provide for Operation of Unlicensed

NII Devices in the 5 GHz Frequency Range, Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 1576, IN 63-71
(Jan. 9, 1997).
146 See Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia:Building the Commons of the Digitally Networked Environment, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 335 (1998) ("This proposal
would have, in effect, chosen one spectrum-sharing technique. While reasonable, it is not
the sole option for operating without interference. The Commission decided to avoid technique-specific regulation, and to allow equipment manufacturers flexibility in designing
their system.).
147 See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
148 Reply Comments of UTAM, Inc./WINForum, supra note 113, at 5-6.
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classes of Part 15 devices, the minimal set of access protocol rules governing power density of the U-Nil world
may be sufficient to distribute uses
49
1
priority.
legal
establishing
without
The Part 15 Rules, which strictly protect legal priority for licensed users,
have been very effective in ensuring that interference caused by unlicensed
devices have not presented a major problem.' 50 The enforcement actions
taken by the FCC's Enforcement Bureau against individual Part 15 users
have received relatively little notice in spectrum policy debates. Perhaps
this is due to the FCC's effective control over interference through requiring manufacturers to subject their devices to the Part 15 authorization
process. Normally, interference cases occur when Part 15 devices become
faulty and cause intermittent interference to licensed services, lasting anywhere from a few minutes to a few hours. After a brief investigation, the
source of the interference is usually identified by FCC field personnel and
the faulty equipment is repaired or replaced at the owner's cost. In fact,
between 2000 and 2004 the FCC took action in 35,993 cases, of which
3,838 were interference-related cases. Of the interference cases, only 65a scant 1.69%-were cases involving Part 15 of the FCC's rules. 5' In addition, UTAM reports that there have5 2been no instances of interference between U-PCS and microwave users.
What we can conclude is that when the cost of interference is less than
the benefit of being free from the cost associated with a licensed regime, an
unlicensed regime is likely to benefit spectrum users. A certain amount of
interference between devices is acceptable; however, beyond a certain limit
it constitutes harmful interference and therefore will require some form of
external intervention to distribute competing use.
B. Relocation
PCS provides the only glimpse of how an unlicensed regime fairs in relocating incumbent spectrum users. Unlicensed operation has traditionally
been afforded through underlay rights without the need to relocate incumbent spectrum users. With the exception of unlicensed PCS, there is really
no such thing as "unlicensed spectrum."' 5 3 Rather, unlicensed devices are
149Benkler, supra note 146, at 335.
150 It

can be argued that the dearth of interference cases suggest that the Part 15 rules are

overly stringent, not allowing for more flexibility which might result in a greater number of
interference problems. Such an argument might hold that the benefit of greater flexibility
(higher power levels, fewer restrictions on wave modulation, etc.) would outweigh the cost
of any increased interference.
151Special thanks to George Dillon of the FCC's Enforcement Bureau, who was indispensable in obtaining these examples from the Commission's documents.
152 In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules to EstablishNew PersonalCommunications Devices, UTAM Report to the FCC, GEN Docket No. 90-314, at 1 (July 1, 2005).
151See 47 C.F.R. § 2.106 (2005).
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permitted, with caveats, to emit RF radiation in almost any portion of the
spectrum, even in frequency bands for which licenses have been granted.
Most operations share the spectrum with other radio services in those
bands that have been allocated to industrial, scientific and medical equipment ("ISM")." Therefore, the evidence indicates that a regime comprised
of a small number of licensed service providers can be more effective at
relocation than when the cost of band clearing is borne by the sales of enduser equipment.
The relocation of existing users may be essential to ensuring that spectrum is put to its best use. Relocating incumbent users presents agency,
155
hold-out, strategic behavior, transaction cost, and externality problems.
The experience in clearing the incumbent, non-government, point-to-point,
fixed microwave links which previously occupied the bands, has presented
problems for both licensed and unlicensed PCS. Relocation is one way to
prevent the problem of interference, but presents additional concerns regarding uncertainty of future use and the need to finance the relocation in
advance of these future uses. Since one cannot tell in advance, due to the
variability of communications demand, where and when rival uses between
the incumbent and new user will occur, it is necessary to first remove the
existing user, deploy a 56network of equipment where use is likely to be, and
then sell final service.
In order to achieve relocation, the rules stipulate a voluntary negotiation
period followed by a mandatory negotiation period during which new PCS
licensees could arrange to relocate incumbent users. 157 In addition, common relocation costs could be shared among licensees through an FCCapproved plan implementing the clearing houses, PCIA and ITA. By contrast, UTAM, the clearinghouse selected by the FCC to relocate incumbent
microwave links in the unlicensed band, collects a fee based on equipment
sold in order to cover the necessary costs, averaging these costs nationwide. UTAM/WINForum has asserted that "delays in the widespread development of U-PCS are due to the ongoing relocation of microwave incumbents from the U-PCS band."' 15 8 Financing this form of relocation depends on the sale of service by a handful of sources. This arrangement presented agency problems such as a reduced ability to relocate the most
worthwhile links first. Comparatively, licensees with the right to interference protection can better raise capital. In addition, the profit motive ensures better prioritization and the averaging of costs from relocation of
worthwhile and less worthwhile links.
114See 47 C.F.R. pt. 18.

155See generally Peter Cramton et al., Efficient Relocation of Spectrum Incumbents, 41
J.L. & EcON. 647 (1998).
156 See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
151See 47 C.F.R. § 90.677 (2005).
158 Reply Comments of UTAM, Inc./WINForum, supra note 113, at 23.
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One other requirement necessary to completing relocation for U-PCS devices has the unintended consequence of actually changing, in effect, the
rights regime. Unlicensed PCS handset devices must contain a feature that
ensures it will only operate in a location where a U-PCS installation has
been approved by UTAM. This requirement, intended to resolve interference by tying operation to geography, is in effect a license. The requirement is a prerequisite to the grant of the privilege to emit radio energy. The
fact that the grant of the privilege comes not from the FCC directly, but
indirectly from the band manager, UTAM, does not alter the analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
Licensed and unlicensed spectrum regimes are important policy tools for
governing communications networks. The property rights debate between
licensed and unlicensed operation is not so simplistic an inquiry as to result
in only one prevailing regime. Instead, the FCC faces the far more difficult
task of integrating both regimes in parallel while minimizing the negative
impacts of each.
A side-by-side comparison leads to the conclusion that U-PCS is not
truly unlicensed. The licensed versus unlicensed paradigm therefore breaks
down because it shows that, in some way, both classes of service have the
same form of legal relations. In order to effectively relocate incumbent
users, a licensed regime may be necessary, but it is not sufficient. The
privilege of emitting radio energy should be coupled with the right to be
free from harmful interference to compensate for the cost of band-clearing.
Instead of completing relocation through the sales of unlicensed devices,
relocation for unlicensed devices might be accomplished by prescription,
rules ending the licensees expectation of license renewal, or some form of
national trust fund. 59 In sum, relocation will be an important part not
merely in the property rights debate, but as an integral part of a wellconsidered and forward-looking approach to policy reform, encouraging
efficient spectrum use, balancing competing demands, and advancing the
public interests.

159 See e.g., Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act, Bill Number H.R.1320, 108th

Congress (creating a trust fund to relocate federal users from the 216-220 MHz, 1432-1435
MHz, 1710-1755 MHz, and 2385-2390 MHz bands and enabling auctions for new users
with a reserve price 110% of estimated relocation costs).

